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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 910314 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a 
certificate of probable cause in which it held that rule 27, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, not Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 
(1990), controls the release pending appeal process. In 
substance, the trial court ruled that section 77-20-10 is 
unconstitutional. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991), in that the Court has 
determined that the trial court declared a statute 
unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the 
trial court erroneously held that Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 
(1990) is unconstitutional. 
This issue presents a question of law subject to a 
"correction of error" standard of review, under which no 
deference is owed the trial court's ruling. City of Monticello 
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S. 
Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Wiilden, 768 P.2d 455, 
456 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, C. Dean Larsen, was charged with numerous 
offenses, including eighteen counts of securities fraud under 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) and -21 (1989) (amended 1990, 1991) 
(R. 511-26 J1. After the trial court granted defendant's motion 
to sever (R. 1023), defendant was tried on the eighteen counts of 
securities fraud. A jury found him guilty on all counts (R. 
1434-51) . 
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three 
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run 
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on 
each count (R. 1474-91). Execution of the sentence was stayed 
until resolution of the other counts charged in the information 
(Ibid.). Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for a 
1
 The record in this case is in the Utah Court of Appeals, 
where defendant's appeal of his convictions on eighteen counts of 
securities fraud has been argued and submitted for decision. The 
transcript of the hearing on defendant's petition for a 
certificate of probable cause has been filed in this Court. 
2 
certificate of probable cause (R. 1521-23) which, after a 
hearing, was granted2 (see Appendix A; T. 45-48). In granting 
the certificate, the court held that rule 27, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, rather than Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990), 
is the controlling law for the certificate release inquiry (T. 5-
6, 11, 50). The court then set bail at $10,000 for defendant's 
release pending appeal of his securities fraud convictions to the 
Utah Court of Appeals (T. 56). Defendant is currently free 
pending resolution of that appeal. 
The State appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals the 
trial court's grant of a certificate of probable cause and 
release pending appeal on the ground that the court had 
erroneously applied rule 27, rather than section 77-20-10, as the 
controlling substantive law for the certificate inquiry. On July 
10, 1991, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court 
in an order that read in pertinent part: 
After review of the transcript of the 
hearing below it is apparent that, in effect, 
the trial court has held the statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (Supp. 1991) [sic], 
unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly, 
this appeal is within the original 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991) 
and is hereby transferred, pursuant to Utah 
R. App. P. 44. 
Order of Transfer, Case No. 910172-CA (a copy of the entire order 
2
 A copy of the court's order granting the certificate of 
probable cause is contained in Appendix A. That order is not 
part of the record on appeal in this Court and does not appear to 
be in the record on appeal in the court of appeals. The State 
will locate the original order and move for its admission into 
the record of this appeal. 
3 
is contained in Appendix B). On September 18, 1991, this Court 
formally accepted jurisdiction over the case in a minute entry 
that read in pertinent part: 
The court has determined that the trial 
court declared a state statute 
unconstitutional and that jurisdiction 
therefore lies in the Supreme Court under 
Section 78-2-2(3)(g), Utah Code Ann. 
Therefore, the parties are directed to 
proceed and to brief the issue of the 
constitutionality of the statute involved, 
section 77-20-10. 
Minute Entry, Case No. 910314 (a copy of the entire minute entry 
is contained in Appendix C). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the question presented for review, a statement of 
facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is 
unnecessary. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously held that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-20-10 (1990) is unconstitutional. The statute is 
constitutional as either a legislative enactment of substantive 
law on a matter that is solely within the province of the 
legislature or a valid amendment to rule 27, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Whether to allow for release pending appeal and the 
conditions under which such release may occur are questions 
solely within the province of the legislature. Although the 
courts have split on the issue of whether release pending appeal 
4 
is a matter of procedure or one of substantive law, the better 
view is that the release question is a matter of substantive law 
and therefore is controlled by statute. Under this view, section 
77-20-10 is a valid legislative enactment of substantive law, and 
any conflicting provisions contained in rule 27 are ineffective. 
Alternatively, if this Court concludes that the release 
question is procedural and therefore subject to the Court's 
rulemaking authority, section 77-20-10, which was approved by 
two-thirds of both houses of the legislature, is a valid 
amendment to rule 27 under article VIII, section 4. The trial 
court erroneously concluded that section 77-20-10 had not 
received two-thirds approval. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-20-10 (1990) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IN THAT RELEASE PENDING 
APPEAL IS GOVERNED SOLELY BY STATUTE; 
ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF THE COURT MAY BY RULE 
SET THE STANDARDS FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL, 
THE LEGISLATURE MAY, UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, AMEND THE COURT'S RULE, AS IT 
DID BY ENACTING SECTION 77-20-10 BY TWO-
THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES. 
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court 
erroneously ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990) is 
unconstitutional. Resolution of this issue is best arrived at by 
first examining the recent history of the law concerning release 
pending appeal and then analyzing the specific constitutional 
questions presented. 
A. History 
In 1980, the legislature enacted comprehensive rules of 
5 
criminal procedure. 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1; see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-35-1 through -33 (1982) (repealed effective July 1, 
1990). In an administrative order issued September 10, 1985, 
this Court adopted all the existing statutory rules of procedure 
M[p]ursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, 
Constitution of Utah, as amended."3 In re: Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). The 
Court refined this order in a subsequent administrative order by 
specifically adopting "all existing statutory rules of procedure 
and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982 
& Supp. 1988) not inconsistent with or superseded by rules of 
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, with the 
exception of section 77-35-12(g) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and 
(d)." In re: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
In 1989, the legislature repealed Chapter 35 of Title 
77 effective July 1, 1990 and established a committee "to review 
Chapter 35, Title 77, Code of Criminal Procedure to determine 
which provisions should be reenacted as codified substantive law 
under Article VIII, Utah Constitution." 1989 Utah Laws ch. 187, 
3
 Article VIII, section 4, as amended in 1984, provides in 
pertinent part: 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage 
the appellate process. The Legislature may 
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of 
the Legislature. . . . 
6 
§§ 14, 15; see Compiler's Note, Chapter 35, Title 77, Utah Code 
Ann. (1990). Since the passage of the legislation that repealed 
chapter 35, the legislature has reenacted as codified substantive 
law certain provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure 
which are not pertinent to this appeal. See Compiler's Notes, 
Chapter 35, Title 77, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1991). 
Prior to the enactment of the legislation repealing 
chapter 35, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 
(1990). 1988 Utah Laws ch. 160, § 4. That section provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) The court shall order that a defendant 
who has been found guilty of an offense and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail 
or prison, and who has filed an appeal or a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, be 
detained, unless the court finds: 
(a) the appeal raises a 
substantial question of law or fact 
likely to result in: 
(i) reversal; 
(ii) an order for a new 
trial; or 
(iii) a sentence that 
does not include a term 
of imprisonment in jail 
or prison; 
(b) the appeal is not for the 
purpose of delay; and 
(c) by clear and convincing 
evidence presented by the defendant 
that he is not likely to flee the 
jurisdiction of the court, and will 
not pose a danger to the physical, 
psychological, or financial and 
economic safety or well-being of 
any other person or the community 
if released. 
7 
Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure has remained 
unchanged since its enactment by the legislature in 1980 and 
subsequent adoption by this Court. It provides in pertinent 
part: 
• • • • 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall 
be issued if the court hearing the 
application determines that there are 
meritorious issues that should be decided by 
an appellate court. . . . 
In State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), 
this Court held that under rule 27, the court must determine 
whether the issue of fact or law is "substantial," that is, 
whether it is either "(1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah precedent 
that governs, or (2) fairly debatable," i.e., "if Utah precedent 
bearing on the issue presents conflicting points of view when 
applied to the facts of the case or is otherwise unclear." Also, 
the legal issue must be "integral to the conviction, e.g., if the 
error in the proceedings below would be considered harmless, in 
light of the precedent, the certificate should not issue." Ibid. 
The Court specifically rejected the State's suggestion that 
"meritorious issues," as used in rule 27, be interpreted to mean 
"'substantial questions of law or fact which, if determined 
favorably to the defendant on appeal[,] are likely to result in 
reversal or an order for a new trial.'" .Id. at 648 (citation 
omitted). 
And, in State v. Pappas, 696 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam), the Court held that once a defendant has presented a 
8 
substantial issue for appeal, "' f ha i I | j l1 - In ilr-iu^ l -jiil,, ... 
cases In whiU'i, from substantidL evidence, it seems clear that 
the right to bail may be abused or the community may be 
threatened I ,'" tin-' applirdnl i. leltiase, " Id • ' I'» 
Leigh v. United States, 82 S. CL, 994, 99 6 (1962) (Warren, 
Circx:t Justice release pending appeal is denied, the 
' 'speeilH'" written findings c •£ fact setting 
forth the facts . » evidence upon which [it] relies i n determinlng 
that there has been a showing ' * the iipres-'s \ » y ul I'II^HII', ilui w j 
t:l le pendency nl the appeal," JjJ at I I •-* J . 
In sum, rule 27 and section 77-70-10 set forth 
d i f f fi r e 11 f s t <-) 111 I  a i 'd s I i i i i JI t e n n i 11 i 1111 I il 11 I I I M J a 1 n ' 11II i | i J t- > b t. j 11 JMI t o r 
release pending appeal: Has the defendant presented a 
substantial q u e s t i ^ - u iui ppeal? Furthermc 
undei the t a presumpt . ;j,n in favor ». . 
release If a substantic ssue rcr appeal H presented; that 
presumption is reversed und* 
p
 Constitutional Issues 
There i s no federal consti tutionaJ right to release on 
bad 1 pending • Bowmai i u ., United States, 3 3 9 "t 
(1964); United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th :. 
1985); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 547 A.2d 1236f 1242 (Pa^ r. 
1988); Browning v. State, 
(1985 Nor i s there such a right under the state constitution; 
in Utah, M [ p ] e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d r " a i • i i iin» „i i i» ,ba j ,11 a b J i« pt«m j i 11 i 
appeai only as prescribed , Utah C'nnst. art, I, § H (2) 
See also McDermott, 547 A.2d at 1242 (no state constitutional 
right to bail); Kordelski v. Cook, 621 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okl. Cr. 
1980) (same). Thus, the initial constitutional question is not 
whether there is a constitutional right to release pending 
appeal, but rather which branch of government, legislative or 
judicial, has the ultimate authority to define the standards for 
release pending appeal. To decide this question, the Court must 
consider whether release pending appeal is a matter of procedure, 
which lies primarily within the province of the judiciary and its 
rulemaking authority, or a matter of substantive law, which lies 
exclusively within the province of the legislature. 
Courts that have addressed this issue have reached 
different conclusions. For example, in People v. Williams, 143 
111.2d 477, 577 N.E.2d 762 (1991), the Illinois Supreme Court 
struck down as unconstitutional a statute similar to section 77-
20-10. The supreme court had adopted a rule for release pending 
appeal which provides that convicted defendants may be admitted 
to bail on appeal at the discretion of "a judge of the trial or 
reviewing court;" on the other hand, the Illinois Legislature had 
enacted a statute which required the court to order a convicted 
defendant held without bond pending appeal unless the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the defendant is not 
likely to flee or pose a danger to others; (2) the appeal is not 
for the purpose of delay; and (3) the appeal presents a 
substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal 
or an order for a new trial. 577 N.E.2d at 764-65. Relying on 
10 
the separation ^f powers provision of the Illinois Constitution, 
the court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
"fi i r e r f , J y a n d i r r v\ *" M M I I nil > I ) H I f 1 I I "i I. " &-
Id. a t 765. Although the court, did not explic: * .y state 
proposition ^ ^ L T I I S I y viewed the niair r r * -eleas^ i 
cedure committed sole-- .- authoi . :. y n i 
contr ,. cr • *- judiciary Ibi d 
another i: ecei i t opi i :i :i < u I hf» ()h i. u Supreme (. on i I M > i • 
expl*:.t.j> - Although " [t]he rigY : \* app.y t ;r ail 
pending appea] clearl substantia- :> • ? '^r <: * be 
gra 
legislature . ;ttempt u;e i . .: : * * apply f r release 
pending appeal •' r statute that conflicted with H M 
t.ional.. i M ringed on the court's 
- ...emaking authoi * <- State ex rel. Silcott v. Spahr, 50 Ohio 
O I . J U 110! 5r . " cvl tlidi, ! he 
procedure * .*....* . applying - : * r. 3 been committed 
* -.s cour •  rulemaking authority by Section r. | P1.) Article IV, 
\. u i 1 - . . . 1111111 I 1 I in 1 il 1 1 JII H1, tutional provision] also 
clearly invalidates statutes that conflict with aiid rules." 
552 N.E.2d at u :MI (emphasis added). 
11 :i State v. Currington ;^ . ,. ^O^ " ^ 942 
(1985), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the question 
"whether post-conviction Lhin 
I: :J le prerogative of the legislature, or is rather a procedural 
consideration governed by the rules ci
 Ltf< . C O U X L . " 7 
11 
943. Consistent with the position adopted in Williams and Spahr, 
it held that the issue of bail pending appeal is "one of 
procedure rather than of substantive law," and invalidated as an 
infringement on the court's rulemaking authority a statute that 
conflicted with a court rule by limiting in certain respects bail 
pending appeal. JTd. at 944. 
However, a number of courts have held that the matter 
of bail pending appeal is one of substantive law which lies 
solely within the province of the legislature, and therefore is 
controlled by statute. See, e.g., State v. Dist. Court of Second 
Judicial Dist., 715 P.2d 191, 194-96 (Wyo. 1986); Willis v. 
State, 492 N.E.2d 45, 46 (111. App. 1986); State v. Hawkins, 140 
Ariz. 88, 680 P.2d 522, 523-24 (Ariz. App. 1984); Kordelski v. 
Cook, 621 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okl. Cr. 1980). As noted in Hawkins, 
"'[s]ubstantive law is that part of the law which creates, 
defines and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial or 
procedural law is that which prescribes the method of enforcing 
the right or obtaining redress for its invasion.'" 680 P.2d at 
523-24 (quoting State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 110, 392 P.2d 
775, 776 (1964)). "[T]he right . . . to remain free pending 
appeal [is] clearly a right and not a method of enforcing a right 
or obtaining redress for its invasion." Ibid. Cf. Avila South 
Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So.2d 599, 608 (Fla. 
1977) (cited with approval in Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. v. 
Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983)). 
These decisions represent the better view. They are 
12 
: : *,.»11 j, i s L e11L w n 1.If1 a i: t, i c 11 .• I, s e c t i .. : '-• n s L \ a: : n , 
which now provides that M[p]ersons convicted of a crime aie 
bailable pending appee - J a v ( eiripln.! • 
added), and the enactmen; ..I section "'-. a in the same year 
that the legislature approved the constitutional amendment that 
addp • rr:.. 
Laws -,:i zr < - r.Vo :r:- :. ^ t:,ere are tew n •*€-
substantive issuer .udu uic XO.T • whether ux nut a 
pert -:. 3\t- ;. regardless i whether that 
dete:rminatic - i ase «po: ci sentenc- •:: mprisonment 
the right , denial ••.•••. 
requires a balancing - some o- * i-, p< *, , 
considerations confronting .-!••. democracy --^ ndividual's 
!!' ICj l t l l ! t n b t ' J I  II1 H H > I i:OTII f Ill '"" L M U:,1 I I e I' e l l L'"f;J d l H l i J I t ' d 1 I ' b i l ' d L i t " 1 1 t)f 
government, ai id the demand that society be protected from 
criminals an :i that persons be punished for societc 
State , . Currinqton (Bakes, "* issenting). 
Moreover en - }>ryt * ( oisv,ction, on appeal the defendant is 
presumed gui i 11111111 > 11 1 >1111 \w i 11 n i 11»y (-„> i s j 1 j I i 
error, See State v. Gotschall, 782 r.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Hami1; . 
convict..; ^he community's interest In punishment and in 
protection i enhanced, and the defendant s right tr I'M fi"<« in in 
'•I1 ->'« "i • aiminishes.,f Currinqton, /nil [\Ai .it "li'l'H 
(Bakes, dissenting)• 
Because "[t]he question of right to bail is wholly 
substantive at the point of appeal," ibid., section 77-20-10 
does not invade the rulemaking province of the judiciary. The 
people, acting through their legislature, have done nothing more 
than they are entitled to do: balance the competing policy 
considerations and define by statute the parameters of release 
pending appeal. Ibid. Accordingly, this Court should hold that 
the trial court erroneously invalidated section 77-20-10, that 
the release pending appeal question is governed solely by 
statute, and that insofar as rule 27 conflicts with the 
substantive law contained in the statute, it is ineffective. See 
State v. Hawkins, 680 P.2d at 524. 
Alternatively, even if this Court were to conclude that 
the release pending appeal question involves only procedure 
rather than substantive law, and therefore is subject to the 
Court's rulemaking authority, section 77-20-10 is nevertheless a 
constitutionally valid legislative amendment to rule 27 under 
article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which permits 
the legislature to amend the Court's rules of procedure and 
evidence with the approval of two-thirds of both houses of the 
legislature. Both houses passed H.B. 79, which enacted section 
77-20-10, by a two-thirds vote (House: 62 yeas, 4 nays, 9 absent 
or not voting; Senate: 26 yeas, 0 nays, 3 absent). House 
Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 247 (Jan. 26, 1988); Senate 
Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 732 (Feb. 23, 1988). There can be 
little doubt that the legislature, by enacting section 77-20-10, 
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s u m flit in , . elease pending appeal 
contained n- .:.*: v.a- *- : ,a State v. 
Nee ley ar.- State _ -,^-as t 
erroneously concluded that ; :.• legislatui- f.au r-^ p. .,— 
section 7 7-20-10 by a two-thirds margin 
l,» 11 r:; J t;H.| i 1'. i cl 1", 1.1 1 b 
to create substantive law, Zamora v. Draper, 6 35 P.2d 78, 80 
(Utah 198 legislature's enactments are afforded a 
, : v.* ; - Ibid , becLi1..!. " •' - i1- Id . s 
constitutional as either a legislate v.- enactment of substantive-
law or a valid amendment - le ' V I I I j se« : 
-' * * Therefore, this Court should reverse 
*~ -jial cou: • - holding that secti on 77 20-.10 Is 
i t J c d Lc- "il 
probable cause ;•. release • iefendant, and the case should be 
remande - •• - * - •* -• -_rt + ••- reconsideration of flip relpasf 
~tir under he controlling statutory law. 
CONCLUSION 
B a s e d on thf for P<JI > i n ( HI I »j ii in* *i 11 , I In i -. inuii In mlil 
reverse the trial court's holding that section 7 7-20-10 is 
unconstitutional and remand this case for reconsideration of the 
re 1 ea se que s 1 i 1  11 \ 1 1 1 » i I II I ! •. I . 1 il 111, 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _f/J^ciay of December, 19 9 I A. 
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APPENDIX A 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE 
Plaintiff, : CAUSE 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : 
Case No. 891900927 
Defendant. : Judge Leonard H. Russon 
ooOoo 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on February 
19, 1991, with the State of Utah represented by Robert N. Parrish, 
Esq., and Defendant present and represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
Said Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause related to 
Defendant's conviction of eighteen felony counts of Securities Fraud 
contained in the Second Amended Information in the above-entitled 
matter. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict on August 6, 1990. 
The Court finds that Defendant is entitled to a Certificate 
of Probable Cause pursuant to the provisions of Rule 27, U.R.CR.P. 
based upon the fact that the Court determines there are several 
1 
MAR <i 1391 
SAL! !„,**;. 
„t.4wL~**>j«*fii*i 
n
 meritorious issues that ohould bo dooided by the appellate couart 
in this ^natter. Therefore, IT IS 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That a Certificate of Probable Cause relating to the 
Defendant's conviction on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud shall 
issue as of February 19, 1991; and Defendant's sentence is stayed 
pending a final disposition of the matter on appeal. 
2. As a condition of the issuance of said Certificate, 
Defendant shall be required to comply with all previous Orders of 
the Court regarding his release and shall post a surety bond in the 
amount of $10,000.00. Said bond shall be posted or approved by the 
Court no later than two weeks from the date of February 19, 1991. 
3. The Court finds that the aforementioned conditions of 
admission to bail are sufficient to reasonably assure the appearance 
of the Defendant as required by this Court or the appellate court, 
and reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community 
DATED this y f l a y of yX^£<£^1991. 
HONf. LEONARD H. RUB'S 
2 
APPENDIX B 
JL 111991 
OFF'.CE 0> 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUL J l 1991 
Cf 
  ^ jM«y T. Noontn 
Oterk of th# Court 
ooOoo Utah Court ol Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
C. Dean Larsen, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER OF TRANSFER 
Case No. 910172-CA 
The court declines to summarily dismiss the appeal 
herein. Plaintiff argues that its appeal is permitted under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(d) ("a judgment of the court 
holding a statute . . . invalid.") See also Utah Rules Crim, 
P. 26(3)(d) and 27(c). We make no determination whether the 
trial court's order granting a certificate of probable cause 
a judgment appealable by the State. 
is 
After review of the transcript of the hearing below it is 
apparent that, in effect, the trial court has held the statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (Supp. 1991), unconstitutional on its 
face. Accordingly, this appeal is within the original 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991) and is hereby there transferred, 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 44. 
Dated this 
BY THE COURT: 
ID* day of July, 1991. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
APPENDIX C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL TO^^lSI^Tf^^^"' % 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 Iml 
September 18, 1991 * erp 10^991 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK u-.TiCE <•-/< 
ATTORNEY GE.?*V" -
R. Paul VanDam w , v " 
David B. Thompson 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capital Bldg. 
BUILDING MAIL 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 910314 
C. Dean Larsen, 891900927 
Defendant and Appellee. 
The court has determined that the trial court declared a state 
statute unconstitutional and that jurisdiction therefore lies in 
the Supreme Court under Section 78-2-2(3)(g), Utah Code Ann. 
Accordingly, the parties are directed to proceed and to brief the 
issue of the constitutionality of the statute involved, 
section 77-20-10. 
Appellant's brief is due October 28, 1991, 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
